Over the years, Germany has had to dramatically expand its defenses and today it appears to be ready to do so in the end. When Russia annexed Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine in 2014, Germany’s response was thwarted. Berlin held decisive consultations with the Kremlin, imposed a small number of sanctions, and quietly returned to business with Moscow as usual. After Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Prime Minister Olaf Scholz announced Zeitenwende, or “turning point.” He pledged to increase defence spending, send more aid to Ukraine, and rapidly reduce Germany’s energy dependence on Russia. In the end, Zeitenwende was a turning point in the name. Scortz, hamstringed by inscribed within the Union, failed to overhaul the German defense.
But now, German leaders are poised to bring about the change that the situation demands. Bundesag held elections in February, and it appears that Germany’s next government is ready to declare independence from Washington. Germany is prepared for a future in which the United States no longer guarantees Europe’s security. To upgrade the Army and start the economy, Berlin has ended its long addiction to austerity and has since 2009 lifted its constitutional constraint that annual debt expenditures have been limited to just 0.35% of gross domestic product.
This new Germany can support Ukraine without walking behind Washington. Germany is not too tied to the unstable US president who refuses to consult with Ukraine’s Europe. Kiev will benefit from Berlin’s new independence, and the German example may encourage other European countries to enhance their support for Ukraine. Berlin can take the lead by assuming Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and encouraging the European Union to accept Ukraine as a member.
But the promotion of Berlin’s autonomy would be a price. Germany must take a primary responsibility to deter Europe’s Russia. This is a huge and dangerous job. If a more intense form of nationalism takes hold in Europe, revamped German troops could be put into the hands of extremist governments, which could be used to threaten German neighbors. A more independent Germany will strengthen Europe’s presence at the global stage, but when it comes to within-European issues, the continent may struggle to deal with the stronger Berlin.
Missing umbrella
For the past 80 years, West Germany and subsequently Unified Germany have relied on the United States for its security. Although there have always been differences of opinion between the two countries, the relationship has been mutually beneficial. For example, they clashed over the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. But overall, the Germans lived comfortably under the umbrella of American protection. Germany saw no deadly enemies on the horizon, and therefore its safety was considered a function of transatlantic relations.
Angela Merkel, who served as German Chancellor from 2005 to 2021, flourished under the arrangement. Transatlantic cooperation was the foundation of her foreign policy agenda. Merkel envisioned a non-traditional relationship with Russia, mediated by the European Union. Under Merkel, Germany was associated with other parts of the world through diplomacy and commerce rather than military force, and its strategy was informed by its commitment to multilateralism and the rule of law.
When Russian President Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea in 2014, Merkel insisted that there was “no military solution” to the crisis. Her goal was for institutions such as the EU and NATO to be the arbitrators of Europe’s fate, and to maintain the European order at some kind of table. Despite the Russian attacks, Merkel did everything he couldn’t do to change Germany. She wanted to avoid European wars by managing her relationship with Russia and maintaining US commitment to European defense.
Her successor, Scholz, shared her tendencies. His Zeitenwende was cautious and he perpetuated many of Merkel’s policies. In 2022, Scholz established a special fund of over $100 billion to boost Germany’s military capabilities. However, the debt brake blocked more ambitious investments in defense and infrastructure. Germany eventually took over a million Ukrainian refugees and sent billions of dollars of aid to Kiev, but it was slow to deal with its own military deficit.
Germany’s halt approach to defense was not entirely Scholz’s fault. He was restrained not only by his country’s constitution, but also by its political reality. The Social Democrat Scholz Party had a long history of ties with Russia, which returned to Ostopolitik, West Germany’s efforts to normalize relations with East Germany and other Soviet countries in the 1970s. It was difficult to shift the gears completely. Other German parties supported maintaining ties with Russia even after the full-scale Ukraine invasion. The German alternative (AFD) is on the far right, NATO skeptical, Putin-friendly, whose leaders regularly rid Scholz as a warman. During Scholz’s tenure, the AFD has gained a major position, doubling the vote share to 20% in the last election. Scholz also had to manage three party alliances. His block members were not willing to eliminate the brakes on debt. They also refused to separate Germany from Russia’s energy by extending the lifespan of German reactors, which Merkel had closed. Currently, many of these constraints do not apply anymore.
Bulking season
Scholz’s successor, Christian Democrat Friedrich Merz, is keen to reduce Germany’s dependence on the US security umbrella. Given his background, this is something of a surprise. Meltz is proud to be a transatlantic and his party has long embraced West Binzin. This is the concept that Germany must coordinate and cooperate with the United States. However, since US President Donald Trump took office in January, German public sentiment has changed so rapidly that the country’s next leader is almost guaranteed to change the process that has already begun: foreign and economic policies. In March, Bandetag voted to remove the debt brake by a two-thirds majority, clearing up the way Germany spent more than a trillion dollars on defense and infrastructure. Merz vowed to pour money into German military hardware, intelligence and information security.
The broader support for a stronger, more independent Germany lends an aura of inevitability to the country’s perverts. Mertz’s crusades to remove the debt brake were not motivated by personal whims. He led German public opinion across his political spectrum. Today, most Germans believe that the US does not want to take on the security of Europe, and they may even end up stopping support for Ukraine and lowering its military presence in Europe. Mertz has political support to take on debt, improve the country’s defense capabilities and stimulate the economy.
Recent changes in German politics have not emerged from a set of separate policy goals, such as helping Ukraine survive. Therefore, we continue with the realization that older formulas no longer apply. If the US is not a trusted partner, West Bingdon will either drop out of the fad or take on a new meaning. Some Germans have already redefine the concept in cooperation with Europe. Therefore, Germany has changed its stance and freed itself from the constriction imposed by the Soviet Union, the US, Europe and the Germans themselves after World War II.
Other European countries and the US praise Germany’s investment in defense, at least in the short term. France, Poland and the UK share Germany’s unease over Russian design in Europe, and, like Nordic and Southern European countries, we welcome the re-contract in Berlin. Merz can work with these governments to improve Germany’s capabilities in a way that bridges the European gap. The raised Germany will also show Trump that Berlin is responsible for its share in the collective defense. And if the US is pulled away from Europe, more militarily capable Germany would be better positioned to pick up sagging.
A kind giant?
If necessary, for Germany to run today, doing so could have troubling long-term consequences. Europe was mostly peaceful from 1945 to 2014, as Europeans rejected the idea that war could solve the problem. They devised non-military institutions such as the European Union. And offensive nationalism retreated after World War II as Europeans learned to lead patriotic enthusiasm through football rather than war.
Another important factor in postwar peace was the relative demilitarization of Germany. During the Cold War, West Germany had a considerable army, but the country was occupied by foreign powers, including France and the UK. Germany was not entirely sovereign. After the Cold War, Unified Germany was content to reduce its troops and spend most of its defense. Berlin poses no threat.
Germany’s highest ideal is still war-free Europe, but now the country has been restructured, allowing its own decisions to be made. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once described Germany as “too big for Europe, too small for the world.” The country never became a global superpower, but his ideas went, but it cannot be avoided having a dominant position within Europe. Germany has Europe’s largest population and economy. Also, if you acquire a powerful army, you could become a local hegemon.
A raised Germany can make its neighbors unsettling.
The first country to challenge a more assertive Germany was Russia, a traditional German rival in Central and Eastern Europe. Germany is bred for Russia and does so in the midst of a major European war. Already obstructing Germany, Moscow will do everything it can to frustrate Berlin’s strengthening. For example, Russia last year attempted to assassinate the CEO of German weapons maker Rheinmetall, according to a senior NATO official. If Germany bounces back, Russia may cause a crisis to discourage Germans from becoming more autonomous.
The raised Germany remains eternal power only if it cannot avoid the government falling into the hands of the supernationalists. For generations, Europe knows Germany that doesn’t want to use military force. Having overcome the horrors of extreme nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s, Germany did not want to fight its neighbors or burn tensions. However, nationalism is contagious and charismatic leaders can take it in an unpredictable direction. It already predominates in different places, just like China, India, Russia and the US.
A raised Germany can make its neighbors unsettling. Other European countries have already criticized Germany for casting financial weight on Brussels. A wider and more powerful Germany may trigger the rise of nationalism in nearby countries beyond Russia. And greater nationalism near Germany could be fueled by fuel nationalism within Germany itself. And the German army, first strengthened by political centrics, hopes that the pro-European government will either put the German border into the hands of leaders willing to adapt, or abandon EU-style deliberations in favor of military terror mail.
The US can help Europe adapt to rear Germany. If the Trump administration is determined to reduce the European footprint, it should take it slowly. After World War II, the United States became a balanced force when it first collapsed in Western Europe and when the Soviet Union collapsed, in Central and Eastern Europe. A gradual exit from European theatre would be much better than a sudden withdrawal, as the US slowly removes military assets and allows European countries to replace them with their own companies. A rushed change can leave a vacuum of forces that encourage fear and doubt. With proper planning, rear-reared Germany could be just the right size for Europe.
(Source: Foreign Affairs)
Michael Kinmage is a professor of history at the American Catholic University and author of Western abandonment, and is a history of ideas in American foreign policy.
Sudha David-Wilp is Vice President of External Affairs and a Senior Fellow at the Deutsche Marshall Fund in the United States.