This is the text of an exclusive, detailed interview with Mehr News Agency with Alexy Dedov, the Russian Federation’s ambassador to Tehran.
Iran and Russia’s relations have been called “strategic” for the past few years. Do you think these bonds are strategic and two neighbors are called strategic partners?
Moscow appreciates its friendly relations with Tehran, which shares a common view on most global and regional issues. Our relationships are based on a long-standing tradition of friendship and good neighbors, mutual understanding and trust, and are characterized by a sincere desire for close cooperation. We are committed to building a democratic and just world order based on universally recognized principles of international law, multilateralism, and equal and inseparable security, and pursue an independent, sovereign foreign policy. The high level of foreign policy adjustment achieved is natural and logical. He actively cooperates with multilateral platforms such as SCO, BRICS and EAEU to support these organizations in joining Iranian friends. In particular, partners outside the CIS space do not have status corresponding to all three major groups.
Over the past decade, under the leadership of both countries’ leaders, Russia-Iran relations have been significantly strengthened, gaining historically unprecedented momentum and depth. We pursue courses to expand multi-faceted collaboration in all critical areas. The mutual desire to strengthen partnerships is confirmed by frequent contacts (Pacific) at the highest and advanced levels. Intergovernmental, section and sectoral cooperation has developed successfully, but interregional and sister city ties have also been strengthened.
Trade and economic cooperation are growing steadily. At the end of last year, growth reached 13.29%. This is close to record levels for 2022. Given the free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran came into effect on May 15th, I am sure this figure will be even higher.
We are actively working to resolve the remaining issues and begin construction of the Rasht-Astara Railway as soon as possible. We continue to build second and third units of the Buchere Nuclear Power Plant, and we are implementing many other major investment projects in the energy sector.
Given all the factors mentioned above (the trust-based nature of our contacts and the nature of national interests), the greatest political leadership of both countries chose to increase the level of relations. As President Putin of Russian Federation said, the updated interstate treaty signed during a historic visit to Moscow from Masuud Pezeshkian in Iran on January 17, 2025, is “a true groundbreaking document setting ambitious goals for deepening cooperation in the long term.” This is definitely a groundbreaking event. For the first time, the relationship was recognized as comprehensive strategic partnership status. This fully reflects the profound and qualitative changes that have occurred in the cooperation between Russia and Iran.
In your opinion, can the issue of “sanctions” be viewed as a challenge or driving force in Iran-Russia relations? So, what measures have been taken to promote banks, foreign exchange and trade exchange between the two countries in dealing with sanctions? Do you think the roadmap for China and the United Arab Emirates would be considered a deterrent or facilitator of Iran-Russia economic ties?
Undoubtedly, the illegal, unilateral sanctions imposed on our country are not only a serious challenge, but also a factor in the growth of Russia-Iran’s trade, economic and investment cooperation. We strive to fully utilize existing possibilities, form favorable conditions, and create additional mechanisms to stimulate mutual trade.
For example, an independent payment infrastructure has already been created and is functioning properly, allowing trading in national currencies. Their share is now over 95%. Mutual acceptance of national payment cards has been ensured. Our citizens have gained the ability to make cashless payments for goods and services during mutual visits.
The entry into force of the aforementioned free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran will contribute to further liberalization of the trade regime by reducing and eliminating tariff and non-tax barriers. This relates to issues regarding market access, sanitation and plant inspection measures, and simplification of customs procedures. In total, over the past three years, our legal and contractual framework has been expanded by 40 divisions and inter-sectoral documents, most of which are intended to increase the trade turnover between Russia and Iran.
The emergence of a multipolar world order involves deepening the crisis of economic globalization and the accelerated fragmentation of global trade systems under the influence of destroyed production and distribution chains, and the collapse of market mechanisms. The algorithms for foreign economic cooperation have been reformatted. So, what are our reactions to changing conditions?
In addition to separate financial infrastructure from the West, as well as tools associated with tools to support international trade, today, together with Iran, we are creating essentially a completely new continental transport artery, the North-South International Transport Corridor, which is becoming the central logistics axis of Eurasia.
Overall, we are interested in establishing multilateral cooperation and implementing joint integration projects with all constructive countries, including friends from Iran, China and Emirati.
Military defense cooperation between Tehran and Moscow has been recognized as at a good level, especially in recent years. Could this type of cooperation be considered within the framework of the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement between Iran and Russia, signed on January 17, 2025?
The interaction between Russia and Iran in the fields of military and military technical cooperation is not a new phenomenon. Importantly, for decades, it has fully complied with international law and is not directed towards the interests of third countries. Naturally, it is attracting attention to our new strategic treaties.
The treaty includes an article that if one of the parties is attacked, it will not provide military or other assistance to the invaders. Target areas include training military personnel, exchanging cadets and instructors, visiting warships at each other’s ports, participating in defence exhibitions, holding joint sports and cultural events, maritime projects for assistance and rescue, marine piracy, and fighting maritime robberies. Furthermore, in order to maintain peace and security in the region, the treaty provides for military exercises to be conducted on the territories of the parties and provides consultations to combat common military threats and security risks. Overall, the treaty codifies and systematizes areas of cooperation that have been engaged in over the past few years.
At the international level, how will President Donald Trump’s approach to solving the Ukrainian issue and the possibility of an agreement with Tehran affect Iran-Russia relations?
It must be emphasized that our relationships between countries are weather resistant, strategic and not subject to the effects of the current international situation. These are the fundamental principles defined by the best political leaders of both countries.
We advocate for political and diplomatic reconciliation on Iran’s nuclear program on conditions that are acceptable to Tehranian friends, including lifting illegal, unilateral sanctions. If necessary, we are ready to provide the necessary support to our partners, taking into account the experience and decisive contributions we made when closing the “nuclear trade” in 2015.
We thank our Iranian friends for their objective and balanced attitude regarding the situation in Ukraine. We continue to communicate with representatives of the US administration regarding the Ukraine crisis. It provides a detailed explanation of its root cause and Genesis. It clarifies the vision of the parameters of the settlement, taking into account Russia’s legitimate interests primarily in the areas of safety and human rights protection. It appears that our American interlocutors have come to understand our position better. There are signs that we are moving in the right direction.
Given the potential areas of cooperation between Iran and Russia, should Tehran’s position in Moscow’s foreign policy be viewed as dependent on Russia’s balance game in the global system, or should I increase Iran’s position in Russia’s foreign policy?
I have partially answered your question in my previous comments. Russia and Iran are self-sufficient in relations. Without a doubt, we still have a lot to do to bring trade and economic cooperation along the possibilities of our country. At the same time, an analysis of the full scope of relations reveals that Iranian direction is one of the top priorities of Russia’s foreign policy. This is determined both by its position as a major regional power in the Islamic Republic and its international status, taking into account the full membership of the SCO, the invitation to BRICS, and the status of the observer of the EAEU. To understand how much attention our country’s leadership pays to bilateral cooperation, I would like to introduce you to the high-level contact dynamics. In my opinion, everything is clear here.
MP/