Madrid – Most European political analysts, and even some Americans defending liberal consensus, the West has undergone an international restructuring that is as important as those in 1989, 1945, or 1919. This is the turning point that defines the entire generation.
Like those historical moments, the decline of the liberal international order that emerged in the 1990s creates both expectations and uncertainty as past certainties began to crumble at high and low levels.
According to these same experts, the final blow to the order came when the US, which existed as a major guarantor in the 90s and 2000s, began to dismantle a handful of it. In fact, foreign policy says that under the leadership of Donald Trump, the country has become the world’s largest revisionist force. Until recently, the term “revisionist” was applied to China and Russia in the West, referring to attempts to change the global status quo. But in recent months, it has also begun to be linked to the United States, where political drift is becoming increasingly illicit.
These trends are reflected in the principles that define new political orders, according to foreign policy. This is reflected in the international economy, dominated by a zero-sum approach to dealing with others’ losses and a power politics inspired by the logic of Thucydides, that “they need to be strong and weak.”
This adjustment of the Western liberal order has had a direct impact on Western Asia, particularly Iran. According to Iranian analysts like Mohsen Baharvand, Europe has found itself in an ambiguous position. On the one hand, they are seeking alternatives to reduce their dependence on the US, while on the other hand they continue to send alliance signals to Washington.
In this context, Baharvand argues that Europe can resort to “snapback” mechanisms (re-challenges on sanctions) as a way for Europe to align itself with the US strategy. In other words, it will use the reactivation of other issues related to Tehran as a way to turn the “Iran issue” into the central axis of relations with the US and strengthen its relations with Washington.
The European Union is able to choose a more independent stance in relations with Iran and distance itself from the US approach. Disagreements about the war in Ukraine and increased interference in Washington’s European interior affairs could encourage Brussels to break away from Western Asia’s US strategy.
However, this scenario faces structural obstacles. Europe continues to interpret foreign policy under the same framework inherited from the Cold War, with the United States as the axis of the international order and the EU as a secondary partner. As a result, Europeans still believe that they are unable to act at a global stage, except for Washington’s leadership. Iran is no exception.
Iranian analysts share this view. They argue that Europe lacks the capacity to define independent policies towards Iran regardless of their alignment or fragmentation with the US. Before Voldimill Zelensky visited the White House last week, Karasu pointed out: “Look at the world. Iran, Russia, China and North Korea are working together. To face this axis, we need unity.”
When asked about the EU’s stance on Tehran, Estonian diplomats admitted that the discussion was postponed. “We wanted to talk about Iran, but the meeting was delayed until March due to the absence of some foreign ministers,” her words reflect the uncertainty in Brussels, reflecting the pressure from Washington and the need to redefine its strategy and the need to redefine it in the face of growing tensions with its traditional allies.
Despite these doubts, the opportunities that Iran offers are clear. The geographical location that bridges Europe, Asia and Africa gives it a strategic role in reconstructing the global order. In the crisis and trade conflict scenario, Tehran represents a key European node to strengthen relations between East and West Asia without relying on the US.
To establish itself as a global force, the EU needs a network of relations independent of other global forces. In this respect, the Iranian location provides direct land access to East Asia’s emerging economies. Furthermore, the current context is unprecedented. The rift between Washington and Brussels has never opened an unprecedented margin of Iranian foreign policy.
With this new board, Tehran is still facing two still uncertain scenarios. On the one hand, despite the differences, the possibility that Europe and the US will maintain a strategic alliance on Iran. Meanwhile, the crisis between the two powers could allow Iran to develop a more practical and beneficial relationship with the EU, rather than relying on passivity or conflict.
In European capitals, alarms are tactile. Several politicians and analysts have begun to increase the chances of an ending of NATO. Uncertainty is strengthened in the face of Washington’s decision. Does the United States want Ukraine’s survival to be undermined as a sovereign state? Is Donald Trump trying to “reverse Kissinger” to abandon Russian President Vladimir Putin’s alliance with Xi Jinping and form an unexpected partnership with Washington? A transatlantic crevices of mistrust opened between both sides of the Atlantic.
In this context, Europe faces a new reality. NATO and the US military and strategic support are no longer unquestionable guarantees. Once a robust security architecture begins to crumble, leaving behind a weakened structure that has been gradually exposed to erosion. In this scenario, the only viable option for the European Union is to adapt to change, seek new alliances, redefine its role in a world undergoing restructuring.