Tehran – Professor Heinz Gertner, a well-known scholar of international relations and political science at the University of Vienna, brings decades of expertise in world security, transatlantic relations, nuclear non-proliferation and Western Asian geopolitics.
He has a rich academic background, including the prestigious Fulbright Fellowship at Stanford University and Johns Hopkins University, as well as leadership roles at the Austrian Institute of International Studies and International Peace Research in Vienna. His award-winning publications, including his acclaimed works on “China and Eurasia,” provide deep insight into the changing dynamics of global power.
The Tehran Times conducted an interview with the professor to discuss the latest debate on the handling of Iran’s nuclear issue in Europe, including a recent statement by French President Emmanuel Macron, who accused Iran of a shortage of institutions. In an interview with Israeli media, the French leader said Europe had rejected a “rational” offer from diplomats.
Macron’s remarks were quickly rebutted by Aragut himself, analysts and other Iranian authorities, but we asked Dr. Gertner how common it is for world leaders to dismiss foreign legal and official representatives based on similar claims to the French president. He also discussed the geopolitical interests surrounding Iran’s diplomatic initiatives, interactions of regional and global authority, and wider impacts on peace and security in West Asia.
Below is the full interview:
1. Emmanuel Macron gave a high-profile interview with Israeli outlets on September 19th just before the important UNSC meeting. From your view, what was the intended message of this media choice, and how does it coincide with France’s diplomatic stance in the region? Was this symbolic, strategic or purely rhetorical?
In the interview, which took place before the UN Security Council on September 19, President Macron announced that UN sanctions will be reimposed on Iran. However, Macron’s main intention was to warn Israel about the risk of losing its reputation and credibility from the war in Gaza. He also emphasized that France must prepare a position that could recognize Palestine as a nation, and that Israel must accept a solution for the two states. This message was directed to all provinces in the Gulf region (Persian).
2. Iran remained fully compliant with its nuclear commitment until 2019, maintaining its overall year compliance after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. Even after that period, Tehran continued to keep its diplomatic channels open. How do you assess Iran’s approach during this period, how do you assess the role and effectiveness of European countries in dealing with Iran’s stance and maintaining diplomatic engagement?
The JCPOA is one of the most carefully negotiated arms management agreements in history. President Trump’s withdrawal in 2018 was one of the biggest shocks in post-Cold War international politics. However, it must not be forgotten that there were attempts to revive the JCPOA in 2021-22. After President Biden gave the green light, EU-3 began negotiations in Vienna in April 2021. By the end of June, 80% of issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief had already been agreed. Iran was built on these negotiations and should have accepted the proposal proposed by the European Commission in the fall of 2022.
3. Macron has rejected Iran’s recent diplomatic proposals on the grounds that the Foreign Ministry does not have full political support. Given that Abbas Araghchi explicitly stated that the plan has the approval of all major bodies, including the best national security council, how do you interpret this inconsistency in French reasoning?
President Macron was probably referring to conflicting signals from Iran regarding Cairo’s interpretation of the agreement with the IAEA. It was not entirely clear whether Iran would allow inspectors to access all relevant sites (Fordow, Natanz, Isfahan) and stockpile of very rich uranium. However, foreign politicians must say that they must accept the statements of the official representatives of the country, whether they agree or not.
4. In your view, what leverage does Iran still hold in the field of multilateral diplomacy? Will Tehran continue to use back channels and regional alliances (such as BRICS, SCO) to offset European-led initiatives at the UN?
As the UN Security Council vote has been demonstrated, Iran cannot rely on external forces to offset its E-3 initiative. The resolution was passed by nine votes in favour of maintaining multilateral sanctions that have hurt Iran. There was no need for veto. Iran must act on its own to avoid new multilateral sanctions.
The best way forward is to work with E-3. Their demands can be met without losing face for Iran. More effective cooperation with the IAEA beyond the Cairo agreement is possible. Iran is banned under the JCPOA, so it needs to clarify where the very rich uranium is to be given up on future agreements anyway. Iran should show encouraging to resume consultations with the US. Of course, both parties are required for negotiations. It should also be noted that E-3 removed the demand for zero enrichment. However, it is fair that Iran will not demand a new military strike during negotiations.
5. Is there a risk that these sanctions will set dangerous precedents where political motivations from a few actors could invalidate multilateral diplomacy? If so, what does that mean, whether it is a relationship with Iran for future nuclear negotiations?
Sanctions can only be lifted by negotiation, whether multilateral or bilateral. Political motivations are always involved in international relations, but there is no choice. If diplomacy fails, the Iranian people and the economy will bear the costs.
6. During the 12-day war, Israel and the United States targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguard. How does international law, including the Vienna Convention, see these attacks? Are they a violation of Iran’s rights and protection of private infrastructure? And why is Iran often overlooked in international debate?
The use of force against sovereign states clearly violates the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution and the IAEA Committee’s decision also prohibit the use of force on nuclear facilities. The UN Security Council and the IAEA should have condemned the attack. Civil targets must be avoided under international humanitarian law. This also applies to self-defense.
7. What role do you see in international law and UN procedures to resolve such deeply politicized conflicts? Can the Security Council still function as a fair arbitrator or become a forum for geopolitical competition?
The fact that states, particularly great powers, produce international law does not mean that international law should be abandoned. Such violations are not the fault of the law itself. Without international law, the only option remains unlimited brute force in a disorderly world. The Security Council’s veto remains a barrier, but without it, the great power may abandon the United Nations altogether. Ultimately, the United States was the only country to vote against a recent resolution on humanitarian assistance to Gaza.
8. With the Security Council split into Iran, how do you predict the evolving integrity among key players such as China, Russia, Europe, and the US? Will this bring Iran closer to a strategic partnership between Beijing and Moscow?
Iran should avoid being forced into close collaboration between Russia and China with the US and Europe. All great powers pursue their own interests and abandon small states when it suits them. Eventually, China and Russia remain silent during their attacks on Iran, and Russia also maintains close ties with Israel.