Tehran – For at least the past year, three European countries known as E3 have not only failed to take constructive measures to find a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear issue, but have continued to work to block prospects in that direction.
This action partly reflects the chronic inability of E3 to help solve global problems, but can also be interpreted as an ominous move to pave the way for what happened on September 26th in New York.
Remembering a course of recent events can help you better understand such assessments. In November 2024, before a meeting of the IAEA Committee, Director Grossi visited Tehran and reached an agreement with Iranian atomic energy organization on how to deal with 60% of enriched uranium. Satisfied with this achievement, he left Tehran. However, in Vienna, instead of welcoming this constructive agreement, E3 countries have imposed a resolution on the Governor’s Committee and requested that the director provide a comprehensive report on Iran’s nuclear activities. Knowing that the board’s composition supported them, the only concern of the Europeans was to put pressure on Iran and prepare their positions for the snapback mechanism. Therefore, they ignored Grossi’s agreement with Tehran and chose to pursue their own agenda.
E3 even insisted on submitting a comprehensive report as soon as possible before the deadline set by the resolution proposed by Grossi himself to the governor.
Ultimately, the Director’s report was released in early June, and despite Grossi’s nonconstructive approach in preparing the report, it included two major and fundamental messages, including the reopening of closed nuclear files and reviving outdated accusations, beyond the mission outlined in the resolution. Second, all Iran’s nuclear material and activities are under the supervision and protection of the IAEA.
Again, E3 decided to ignore these core messages and led another resolution from the board accusing Iran of non-compliance. This is the term “even the infamous director’s report has not been contained, and was another tool to introduce Iran’s nuclear issue to the Security Council.” However, the resolution opened the door for famous and infamous invaders. Less than 24 hours after the resolution was adopted, Israel launched a war of attack on Iran, and subsequently managed to drag the United States into a conflict.
Following this blatant crime by Israel and the United States, not only was an attack on Iran, but it also effectively halted the violation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, cooperation and testing by the IAEA in Iran. Not only did E3 not condemn the attack, but he even admitted that Israel was doing “dirty work” for them.
E3 insisted that he was trying to give diplomacy another chance as the snapback deadline approaches, as if nothing had happened, and wanted to delay it by six months. Nevertheless, this E3 initiative included one or rather three near-impossible prerequisites, taking into account the remaining time until the expiration of the JCPOA. He has once clarified the US (which attacked Iran during the middle of a diplomatic talk), a full recovery of cooperation with the IAEA, and the status of Iran’s nutritional material.
Before and after the attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, despite E3 dishonestness and the horrifying record of the Secretary-General, Tehran not only did not withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but also called for a way to resume cooperation with the IAEA and begin technical negotiations to draft a practical arrangement for this purpose. After three expert consultations, the Iranian Foreign Minister and Director-General signed the document in Cairo to resume testing, respecting Iran’s security concerns. Grossi was once again satisfied with the deal, but as expected, E3 was not. It showed little enthusiasm for the Tehran Air Agreement. They did not welcome it at the Governor’s Meeting in September 2025. They were the view that they had free snapback options and insisted on using it regardless of the reality on earth and the level of Iranian cooperation or nuclear activity!
Then, on August 28, without passing the conflict resolution mechanism predicted in Security Council resolution 2231, they declared Iran’s significant defect with a resolution to the South Korean presidency of the Security Council. By doing that, E3 took a final step to effectively hand over their role on Iran’s nuclear issue to the United States, and they controlled the United States and waited to see what solution President Trump could come up with.
The final nails in the co-of-the-position were hammered on Friday, September 26th, and they stubbornly voted for a six-month extension of resolution 2231 proposed by Russia and China. There was only 10 days between South Korea’s solution on September 16th maintaining the lifting of sanctions in 2231 and the failure of Russia and China’s extension resolution. During this time, an Iranian delegation led by the President and Foreign Minister attended the 80th session of the General Assembly in New York and made some suggestions to find solutions to the problem. The three countries, despite finding that the proposal is acceptable, are not playing a real role in the matter, but have been unable to act beyond reflecting Washington’s excessive demands.
Given the recent experiences of Iran and the obvious disruptive approach demonstrated by E3 in solving the problems surrounding resolution 2231, it appears that inclusion of E3 in future multilateral processes simply does not add value. E3 repeatedly proves it lacks a credible position to make meaningful decisions on international issues without US consent. Including E3 in negotiations led to resolution 2231 was a mistake by negligence, and repeating the same mistake cannot be justified in the same title!
Mohammad Hassaninejad is Director of Peace and International Security