The German government, plagued by the prospect of US President Donald Trump withdrawing security guarantees, is preparing to fundamentally recalibrate its defence stance. The new coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD) have already agreed to push for a change in the debt brake that paves the way for dramatically higher military spending. German next prime minister, CDU leader Friedrich Merz said the government’s new motto “considering the threat to our freedom and peace on our continents” would need “whatever it needs.”
The litmus test of how serious these efforts are is whether the new government pursues a possible plan B for the US nuclear security umbrella in Germany and Europe. Berlin needs an ambitious nuclear policy rethinking, including the nuclear power of the continent, pushing to replicate nuclear sharing at the European level in France and Britain, to stop Russia and other enemies. It is also essential for Germany to invest in civilian nuclear research to maintain the nuclear incubation period as a hedge. Luckily, Meltz shows his willingness to do both.
As part of NATO’s nuclear sharing, Germany hosts around 20 US B-61 nuclear bombs at Buchell Air Force Base. For the past few decades, the majority of Germans have been in favor of removing these nuclear weapons from Germany. This was part of Germany’s desire to leave all the nuclear weapons, whether it was the military or civilian. In mid-2021, a survey published by the Munich Security Council found that only 14% of Germans supported nuclear weapons in German soil.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led to a dramatic change in public opinion. In mid-2022, 52% of Germans surveyed for Panorama magazine expressed support for maintaining or even increasing US nuclear weapons in Germany. Russia’s attacks on nuclear-free Ukraine, including the threat of using such weapons to stop Europe and the US from supporting Kiev, clearly left a mark on the German population.
In light of such a threat, the majority of Germans seem to have concluded that it is better to be directly under the nuclear umbrella. After the Russian invasion, German Prime Minister Olaf Scholz decided to purchase the F-35 in pursuit of a 100 billion euro ($13.85 billion) contract with the United States, and replace the aging tornado fleet carrying the US nuclear bomb stored on Beauchel Air Base. With this agreement, Scholz aimed to close the US commitment to Germany’s defense.
Of all recent German prime ministers, Scholz probably pursued the closest relationship with Washington. He tried to stick to this path even after President Donald Trump returned to the White House. At the Munich Security Conference in mid-February, Scholz said: “I disagree with solutions that will lead to the separation of security between Europe and America.”
The statement sounds conclusive, but only if it ignores the decision to separate itself from European security in the US. Berlin has no veto here.
Scholtz’s successor, Meltz, speaks in a very different tone. Before the official results were announced on the night of the election on February 23rd, he said: “My absolute priority is to strengthen Europe as soon as possible. Mertz also said it is unclear whether he is “talking about NATO in its current form” by the time of the planned summit in June.
Meltz believes this should include Plan B, which could be a possible US nuclear umbrella. The waiting prime minister proposed a debate between France and the UK as to whether the two would be willing to engage in a nuclear sharing arrangement with Germany.
It is a sea change of German debate. Former Prime Ministers Angela Merkel and Scholz have consistently ignored French President Emmanuel Macron’s offer to engage in strategic dialogue on European nuclear deterrence. At the address aired on March 5th, Macron responded aggressively to what he called Mertz’s “historic call.” The French president said, “We have decided to hold a strategic debate on protecting our allies on the continent through our (nuclear) deterrent forces.”
Merz-Macron alignment provides a solid political foundation for discussions on nuclear sharing of Europeanization. Of course, there are many obstacles, risks and unanswered questions, as critics of these proposals in the German debate are quickly pointed out.
As German arms management researcher Ulrich Künn did, it is easy to downplay “a slightly panicked policy proposal” with “an increase in chorus of experts and policymakers from across the mainstream political establishment that fears our abandonment.” But considering the chaos that the Trump administration caused in just seven weeks, it’s not “panic” to think of a potential US exit from the Transatlantic Alliance. Not pursuing Plan B seriously is terribly irresponsible at this point.
The first requirement is a common vision of realistic political arrangements for expanded deterrence of Europeanization and nuclear sharing. One option is to replicate NATO’s nuclear program group at the European level. France and the UK are the powers of nuclear anchors. To allow the UK to participate, this must be done outside of the formal EU framework. At its core, planning groups should include a small number of major European countries (which is certain to ensure Poland, Italy and Germany). The EU could be collectively represented through the President of the Council of Europe or the EU Secretary of Foreign Affairs. German and Polish leaders have already expressed openness to concrete nuclear sharing arrangements, including the French ability to be stationed in German and Polish soils.
Of course, the final decision on the use of nuclear weapons remains in France and the UK as Macron also highlighted it during his March 5 comment. This reflects the current arrangement with the US. Members engaged in nuclear sharing will contribute financially to the burden of maintaining French and British nuclear weapons.
As early as 2019, Bruno Tertrais, one of France’s number one nuclear strategist, discussed such an arrangement. With obstacles in mind, he also exposed some of the most common criticisms. For example, if combined, limited French and British arsenals are not a perfect alternative to US expansion deterrence, based on weapons several times their size. But that doesn’t mean that deterrents based in France or the UK are unreliable. As Tertrais argued, “a small armory can block key forces if it has the ability to cause damage that it deems unacceptable.”
It is also unconvincing to argue that the focus on Europeanization’s nuclear deterrence is a distraction from the necessary investments in traditional deterrence (including deep, precise strike capabilities). Tertrais argued that Europeans simply need to pursue both. And yes, the UK is relying on Washington for a key element of its own nuclear weapons. However, France’s capabilities are completely autonomous and are essential to reliability in light of what the US could head towards Europe.
It seems very fearful to argue that the push for nuclear sharing of Europeanization would encourage nuclear proliferation globally. South Korea, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey will make their own decisions about becoming a core based on their own assessment of security situations. In the medium term, Germany and Europe should also consider weapon control and trust measures with Russia.
Of course, Germans and others are currently sought nuclear protection from France and the UK, and we may ask ourselves how stable and reliable these European nuclear powers are politically. That’s a valid question. After all, in the UK’s Nigel Farage, Nigel Farage, the leader of the far-right reform British party, is steadily gaining profits. France may be one election as it has a far-right or left-wing party president who is hostile to sharing France’s nuclear deterrent.
That said, the only other option for Germany, except for the European nuclear umbrella, is to pursue its own nuclear weapons. At this stage, political fallout, financial burdens and time it takes to make a German bomb is not a cost-effective alternative. However, as a hedge, Germany needs to invest in maintaining its nuclear latency period. That is, they have the basic capabilities to pursue their own nuclear weapons programmes in situations where no other alternatives are left.
To this end, Germany needs to recommend it for civilian nuclear research. This must be easy for other reasons, due to the age of energy-intensive artificial intelligence and the need to phase out fossil fuels amid ongoing climate change. Major economies such as Germany need to simply be at the forefront of civilian nuclear research.
In the early days of Trump’s first term, Merkel declared, “We Europeans really have to put our own destiny into our own hands.” Still, little or no action continued. Today we see the dramatic consequences of taking that statement seriously in the end.
Merz is very right to ask for a switch to “hope for the best and still prepare for the worst.” This strategy should include Plan B for nuclear deterrence, although it may be uncomfortable for many in Germany.
Thorsten Benner is co-founder and director of the Institute for Global Public Policy in Berlin
(Source: Foreign Policy)