Tehran – The 1952 Luxembourg Agreement was a key moment in Germany-Israel relations, which led them to launch a complex and multifaceted partnership.
There were many contextual aspects of this partnership. After more than a decade of consideration when formal diplomatic relations were established between the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the Israeli regime, there was once again a second important turning point in 1965.
The decision was filled with political, moral and emotional complexities, reflecting the lingering shadows of the Holocaust and the geopolitical realities of the Cold War. Establishing diplomatic relations in 1965 was a bold step towards normalization in the face of threats and agitation. It also revealed the unresolved complexities of relations between the two countries.
A delicate and controversial process
The road to formal diplomatic relations between West Germany and Israel has been long and difficult. For several years after the Luxembourg Agreement, Germany paid reparations to Holocaust survivors and provided assistance to Israel, supporting its economic facilities. However, establishing official diplomatic relations remained a sensitive topic.
This was especially true for many Israelis, some of which were heavily opposed to the idea of formal relations with Germany. The trauma of the Holocaust was still fresh in the memories of most Israelis. The reality of Nazi atrocities was very close.
Political and public opinion is widely divided in Israel, and even the former Prime Minister of Menachem was frankly opposed the notion that he was responsible for one of the biggest genocides in history and formalized relations with a country that killed around six million people. For the first time, those who supported him saw the formal recognition of Germany as a betrayal of the victims of the Holocaust.
Meanwhile, Israeli officials, particularly Prime Minister Levi Esicol and Foreign Minister Gorda Meir, viewed formal ties with West Germany as an important move for Israel’s political and economic security. By the early 1960s, Israel was suffering from an increase in isolation in the Middle East, facing unsatisfactory neighbors with Israel and growing tensions with Soviet-backed Arab countries.
Having emerged as a prosperous postwar economic force and a powerful ally of the United States, West Germany will be a valuable partner for Israel, providing political legitimacy on the international stage as well.
The road to diplomatic relations
One of the most important events in Israeli-German relations before 1965 was the capture and trial of Adolf Eichmann, the leading architect of the Holocaust. In 1960, the agents of the Israeli Mossad had accused Eichmann of Argentina and returned to Israel to withstand trials of his role in the Holocaust.
Eichmann’s trial, which received massive media coverage, caused old wounds from the Holocaust and brought new hostility towards Germany among the many Israelis. The German government feared that the trial would reveal the role of former Nazi officials still employed in post-war Germany. Some German officials were concerned that Eichmann’s testimony could endanger West Germany’s international status, as the “Auschwitz Trials” in 1963.
By bringing Germany and Israel to face the past, whatever the tensions of the Eichmann trials were, it was also led to new diplomatic moments where dialogue was productive.
In 1964, West Germany and Israel began secret negotiations for diplomatic relations. Given the sensitivity of the time, both sides proceeded quietly to avoid public pushbacks and geopolitical consequences. Israeli diplomat Felix Sinner led negotiations with German counterpart Rolf Pauls and made great efforts to alleviate concerns on both sides of the table.
The discussion included a wide range of issues including security assurance, economic relations and protection of the German Jewish community during negotiations.
Establishing diplomatic relations
On May 12, 1965, West Germany and Israel officially announced the establishment of diplomatic relations. The announcement elicited mixed reactions in both countries. In Israel, it sparked a storm of debate and protest in Jerusalem and other cities. Many Israelis, especially Holocaust survivors, felt this was a kind of betrayal of the victims or a moral compromise by the state.
Knesset had a full day debate with opposition leaders such as Menachem that they began to blow up governments. The presentation in Germany has also faced criticism, particularly from the Arab world. Several Arab countries have cut diplomatic ties with West Germany accordingly, and the Arab Federation has announced boycotts on German goods. However, Prime Minister Ludwig Elhard defended the decision, saying that West Germany has a moral and legal obligation to support Israel in all its actions, and that they are also committed to reconciliation.
Establishing diplomatic relations was a key moment in the evolution of German-Israel relations, representing a new stage in their complex history. It is the first time Germany has recognized Israel, and will enable it to cooperate in business and trade, technology and security cooperation.
Establishing diplomatic relations presented a moment of divergence in relations between Germany and Israel. Symbodily, it began the process of transforming German Federal Republic’s commitment to historical responsibility from reparations to more meaningful. In other words, “special relationships” rooted in the shared history of trauma. In reality, it created opportunities for other forms of cooperation.
By 1970 trade had doubled, but cultural exchange programs such as the 1966 Youth Programme expanded opportunities for grassroots bonding. Military, the rapid evolution of arms cooperation has rapidly evolved and became the central foundation of modern alliances.
Nevertheless, this milestone was at a price. For Israelis, it also exacerbated the social rifts, as survivors felt as if their pain was bartering due to politics. For the West Germans, the Arab boycott caused tensions in the economy, which was still in recovery mode, but it was not a catastrophe. Germany was wandering after the war, but they gathered. Hallstein’s doctrine, which was in crisis, began to show signs of collapse, indicating that Bonn’s foreign policy was not as fixed as before.
Importantly, 1965 redefines the narrative of relationships. 1952 was about money for essentials, while 1965 was about recognition and legitimacy of both parties. It forced both sides to see their future. For Germany, the responsibility was to show that it had changed. For Israel, it was to harmonize memory with rational pragmatism.
The stakes grew even more considering the Cold War context. West Germany’s Israel’s choice for Arab neutrality emphasized western mooring and gave Israel European fixedness while regionally segregated.