Tehran – Let’s say you decide to negotiate with Trump under today’s circumstances. This is likely to happen:
First, the United States, and Israel in particular, will interpret this as a sign of Iran’s weakness and victory over Netanyahu’s offensive policies over the past year and a half. As a result, from the start of negotiations, demands on Iran probably have far exceeded just the nuclear issue.
The other side believes their pressure tactics are working, so they could raise that pressure even during negotiations. Even today, Trump appears to be open to talks, but he has already worked for over a month, crippling Iran’s oil sales and significantly reducing revenues. The language of negotiation and the reality of pressure are firmly intertwined.
Therefore, at this stage, agreeing to formal public negotiations does not offer any real advantage. It only validates their pressure strategies and encourages them to escalate it. If they believe they can determine Iran’s national security decisions through pressure, negotiations are essentially doomed from the start.
Furthermore, entering negotiations under these circumstances means that we can expect unusually offensive pressure tactics, as outlined in Trump’s national security memo. The perception that Iran is weakened and mature in submission will make true negotiations impossible. They essentially demand ransom.
It is unrealistic to expect meaningful easing of sanctions, especially in this situation. If our enemies believe that sanctions have led Iran to the table, why would they reduce them? Wouldn’t it make more sense for them to step up sanctions to force Iran’s surrender during negotiations? Accepting negotiations under these conditions prevents the integrity of sanctions relief from being completely undermined.
And we know what’s coming next. Israelis argue that the previous approach is correct and that they need to “finish the work.” As a result, they will definitely push Trump to set very strict conditions for negotiations – asking for more requests while being less. This is the same game they’ve been playing for so long.
At the same time, important games will be unfolded internally in Iran. People will wait to see the outcome of the negotiations. Some officials have argued that, assuming the agreement is a deserved conclusion, they probably put their work on hold and instead lobby for a deal, and that the state would not work without it.
What will the outcome be? We simply enter the negotiations and find out there is nothing to agree with. Instead of recognizing our integrity, the other side considers us weak and vulnerable. Authorities ignore the obligations and the population is in an anti-productive state of expectation. Is this what we really want?
Of course, things could get even worse. Once public anxiety and official expectations reach an important point, some begin to consider more dangerous strategies. Under such circumstances, certainly there are individuals in the United States and Israel who argue that a significant military or security strike could force Iran’s full submission during negotiations. Isn’t that the logical next step in their minds?
I do not argue that this analysis is completely accurate, but the truth is that it is more closely aligned with past experiences than any other scenario you can imagine. Are there any people who believe this time it’s different? If so, they should present a compelling case. I haven’t seen it yet.