MADRID – The massive funeral held in Beirut on Sunday for Seyad Hassan Nasrara was not only the end of the era, but also the beginning of something new. After leading Hezbollah for over 30 years, Nasrara was not only the most visible figure in the movement, but also an important player in regional politics.
Born in the Shia community of Beirut in 1960, Hassan Nasrara was keen to be interested in Islam and politics, and was influenced by Imam Musa al-Sadr. He began the Amal Movement, but joined the newly formed Hezbollah in 1982 after the Israeli invasion. His political career quickly rose. By 1985 he had led the Executive Council of Hezbollah and joined Shura Council. His frequent visits to Iran strengthened the alliance between Hezbollah and Iran under the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faki.
Turning Point appeared in 1992. That year, Abbasmusawi, the then secretary general of Hezbollah, was assassinated in an Israeli airstrike. His closest closest friend, Nasrara, took over the movement’s leadership and adopted a more uncompromising attitude towards Israel. During Musawi’s funeral, he gave a speech defining the trajectory of Hezbollah. “We will continue this path… Even if we are martyred or our homes are destroyed above our heads, we will not abandon our Islamic choice of resistance. ”
From that moment on, his rhetoric left no room for ambiguity. Under his leadership, Hezbollah expanded his military capabilities, increased his influence on Lebanon’s politics, and strengthened his alliance with Iran. The relationship with the group with Tehran was operational as well as ideological. The longstanding relationship between Nasrara and Tehran has shaped the group’s strategy and solidified its position as a major force in West Asia.
More than just an Iranian ally
Despite its close ties with Tehran, Hezbollah was not merely an extension of Iran’s policies in the region. The notion that movement acts as a non-autonomous proxy is being challenged both within and outside of Lebanon. The historical connections between Lebanon’s Shiites and Iran date back to centuries. This is before the creation of Hezbollah in the 1980s.
In the 16th century, the Safavid dynasty invited Shiite clergy from the Lebanese region of Jabal Amir to help integrate Iran’s 12 cyasists. Over the next centuries, thousands of Lebanese students traveled to QOM to study in Islamic seminaries, building deep family and political ties with Iranian Shiite communities. This interconnection grew stronger in the 20th century, when figures like Imam Musa Al Sadr and Mustafa Chamran played an important role in shaping the political identity of Lebanese Shiites.
Nasrara himself has consistently rejected the idea that Hezbollah is merely an artificial creation of Iran. He noted that the movement came into effect organically in response to the 1982 Israeli invasion. Nevertheless, he openly acknowledged the influence of the Islamic Revolution and the influence of Hezbollah’s alliance with the principles of Wilayat al-Faki.
Beyond logistics and religious affinity, what binds Hezbollah and Iran is a shared political vision. Both see resistance to Western influences as a matter of survival. As Abdallah Saffiedine, the representative of Iran’s Hezbollah, he once said:
Similarly, in a 2018 speech, Nasrala revealed that what detains Hezbollah and Iran is a shared political vision, not a military support. “Western people don’t believe in ideological things. Their biggest mistake is to consider resistance simply as an Iranian mercenary,” he said. According to Hezbollah’s leaders, the West cannot understand that resistance is not a logic of subordinate, but one of ideological harmony.
Having studied in the Shiite sacred city of Najaf in Iraq, Nasrara long thought of the belief that the world was trapped in a constant struggle between the oppressed (Mushizafin) and the oppressed (Mushbelin). When Hezbollah published its founding manifesto in 1985, the defense of oppressors against oppressors was one of its fundamental principles.
From this perspective, the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran is based on political convergence rather than on customer-client dynamics, as the West likes to portray. The concept of Wilayat al-Faki, the authority of the leadership of the Islamic Revolution over the community, has grown beyond the framework of nation-states. For followers of this doctrine, Iran is not just a country, but the epicenter of Islamic political and religious projects aimed at serving as a model for the entire UMMA (the Muslim community). This is why Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei is viewed not as an Iranian leader, but as a political authority across borders.
Nasrala repeatedly claimed that Hezbollah was not operating under Tehran’s directive. “Alliance does not mean submission. When one party makes a decision, it does not mean that the other party will follow without questioning its motivation. It will be enforcement, not alliance.” , is important to understand the dynamics between both actors.
One of the most revealing episodes of this autonomy occurred during the Syrian War. Esmeil Kouzli, a lawmaker in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) and a member of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard, said it was Hezbollah that both countries needed to join the fight against Dash terrorists. It was. In his memoirs, Iranian General Hossein Hadani confirmed that Nasrala coordinated the strategy of resistance in Syria, and that even operations involving the IRGC were designed by Hezbollah.
Additionally, various estimates suggest that Hezbollah could continue to operate independently, even if Iran withdraws its support. This shows that the movement has built a financial network that extends beyond its independent structure and support from Iran.
For these reasons, labeling Hezbollah as merely an extension is reductive. This group is not merely an Iranian policy skill, but an actor with unique decision-making and operational abilities. Their relationship is better explained in symbiosis. While sharing a shared worldview with strategic goals, Hezbollah maintains autonomy in decision-making.
In this connection, the funerals of Nasrala and Hashem Safi al-Din were not only politically significant for Hezbollah leaders. It marked a pivotal moment of Lebanon’s resistance as tensions intensified with Israel. Additionally, it offers the opportunity for Lebanese people to show unity in the increasingly complex local landscapes. The message is clear: resistance remains immobilized and does not succumb to external pressure.
At the funeral on Sunday, Hezbollah’s fourth secretary general, Sheikh Naim Qassem, repeated repeated remarks made by Nasrala earlier at the funeral of his predecessor 32 years ago. “Resistance is not over. A new era of resistance is just beginning,” he told the sea of mourners.