As the second round of nuclear talks between the US and Iran begins this weekend, doubt and distrust between the two remains high. US President Donald Trump has poses a threat to the countries I have served as a policymaker and diplomat for many years. Naturally, Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei remains cautious. “We are very pessimistic about the other side, but we are optimistic about our own capabilities,” he said recently.
That’s why many analysts believe there is a small potential for trading. In fact, the US seems not entirely unsure of what outcomes are needed from the negotiations. US Middle Eastern envoy Steve Witkoff stressed that the agreement must be a “Trump deal.” It was clarified from the 2015 nuclear agreement and reached it under then President Barack Obama. Earlier this week, Witkov said Iran could maintain a programme that would enrich uranium by up to 3.67%. He then reversed the course and said the president’s position was to eliminate Iran’s ability to fully enrich uranium.
Still, I believe there is a path forward. These negotiations, which could shape the future of Iran’s nuclear programme, as well as the wider trajectory of the Middle East, are too important to waste. A deal that avoids war, tackles a comprehensive set of issues not just nuclear weapons, and provides Iran with realistic compromises regarding the functioning of its nuclear program.
With its direct or indirect involvement in the nuclear dynamics of the US and Iran over the past 40 years, I think American historical policies have played a pivotal role in fostering today’s nuclear crisis. In the 1950s, under the Eisenhower administration’s “Atoms for Peace” initiative, the US laid the foundations for nuclear Iran, viewing the Shah as a regional ally and guarantor of Western interests. In 1967, the US built Iran’s first nuclear reactor in Tehran. In 1974, the CIA reported to President Geraldford that Shah could potentially acquire nuclear weapons by 1984.
However, Washington changed its position after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. From that point on, despite Iran’s rights under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which guarantees all signatories the right to develop and use peaceful nuclear energy, Iran has sought to block even acquisition of peaceful nuclear technology. During my tenure at the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the late 1980s and early 1990s, our attitude was clear. Iran will abandon Shah’s massive nuclear ambitions and refrain from enrichment and heavy water production if the US provides fuel to Tehran’s nuclear reactors and European countries respect pre-revolutionary contracts and pre-revolutionary contracts to provide fuel. These negotiations failed primarily to shake up US opposition. If Washington agreed, Iran probably wouldn’t have pursued enrichment.
Western resistance spurred Iran to strive for nuclear self-sufficiency. This was achieved in 2002. Iran’s programme quickly became the focus of the International Atomic Energy Agency, prompting negotiations with Germany, France and the UK. As a member of Iran’s negotiation team, I have witnessed Tehran’s unprecedented transparency. This includes stopping enrichment and accepting maximum verification measures. We provided deals to Europe. Respecting Iran’s peaceful nuclear rights under the NPT, Iran will provide comprehensive assurances on weaponization. However, talks broke as the United States refused to allow any form of Iran enrichment, even within the scope of the treaty. Hassan Luhani, Iran’s top nuclear negotiator at the time, said Ayatollah Khamenei would never accept the ban on enrichment. “If Iran waives its right to enrich it, it must happen after my death or I will have to resign from leadership,” Luhani quoted Ayatollah Khamenei as saying at a private meeting.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad resumed enrichment in 2006. In the same year, the US and the European Union called Iranian files to the UNSC. Six UNSC solutions have approved Iran for the next few years. Iran responded by expanding its enrichment capabilities. By 2013, Iran was two months away from its breakout capabilities. The cycle of escalation of sanctions and nuclear advancements left both sides at a strategic impasse.
Recognizing the futileness of forcedness, Obama pivoted. In 2013, the US redefines the red line. It prevented Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons rather than nuclear weapons themselves. The Joint Comprehensive Action Plan (JCPOA), which was obtained as a result of the approval by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, imposed the most disturbing tests on Iran, recognising the right to peaceful enrichment. Tensions in Iran have been dramatically eased. Under the JCPOA, the breakout timeline was extended to at least one year and was to remain for at least ten years.
Despite Iran’s compliance, Trump unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, sparking a “maximum pressure” campaign. In response, Iran has increased levels of enrichment and capacity, reducing breakout times from one year to two months. Former President Joe Biden’s “no deals, no crisis” policy erodes hundreds of more trust, while maintaining Trump-era sanctions. Iran’s current breakout window will be one week.
Trump’s threat only makes the situation worse. “There are two ways to militarily deal with Iran,” he told Fox News last month. Some have suggested that Europe could evoke the JCPOA’s “snapback” mechanism, reviving UN sanctions. If that happened, Iran left both the JCPOA and the NPT and threatened to pursue nuclear weapons if attacked. This is the worst case scenario. It could plunge the Middle East into chaos and turn Iran into the second South Korea. However, I think the Trump team will be able to successfully diplomacy with Iran.
1. It’s not diplomacy, it’s war
From Iraq to Afghanistan, the legacy of America’s failed wars has destroyed trillions of dollars and millions of lives. The war with Iran will be exponentially devastating. Trump must abandon the “trade or war” binary and commit to diplomacy as the only viable path.
2. Comprehensive Agenda
Iran respects all single issue agreements with the United States, including hostage release, anti-terrorist cooperation and the JCPOA after the attacks on September 11, 2001, but the United States has not fulfilled its promise. Therefore, single-problem contracts are inherently unstable. It’s unrealistic to achieve a comprehensive transaction in a short amount of time, but what both parties need now is a comprehensive agenda, a step-by-step roadmap starting with a nuclear file. Success in this domain should pave the way for dialogue on other issues.
3. Realistic nuclear arrangements
Nuclear arrangements must comply with the rights and responsibilities outlined in the NPT. Iran should enjoy peaceful nuclear benefits in exchange for robust verification measures, including implementation of additional protocols and revision code 3.1. Iran could also consider reducing enrichment from 60% to less than 5% and extending the provisions for the JCPOA sunset that contains reprocessed uranium.
To satisfy Trump’s desire for a legacy definition agreement, the US and Iran were able to sign a bilateral agreement that would forever commit to Iran remaining a “nuclear-free state.” In return, the US must remove all nuclear-related sanctions. Congress and Congress ratification will solidify the durability of the transaction.
4. Regional de-escalation
The US and Iran need to engage in local concerns. They need to acknowledge each other’s legitimate interests, negotiate issues of conflict, and cooperate with issues of common interest. Furthermore, it is essential to halt military tensions between Iran and Israel under the UN Charter. Nuclear transactions must serve as a springboard for mutually beneficial security dialogue.
5. Economic integration
Long-term peace depends on mutual economic benefits. The commercial bond between the US and Iran can reach hundreds of millions of years. Such integration would fix diplomatic interests and strengthen moderates on both sides.
This is not easy to achieve. However, agreements are possible and will lead to other positive outcomes in the region. Resolving 40 years of tensions between Iran and its Arab neighbors is equally essential. Through dialogue with eight Persian Gulf countries, the regional security framework could be hosted by the UN Secretary-General with the support of permanent Security Council members. Only through diplomacy, trust building and mutual respect can we achieve the region’s sustainable security architecture.
Seyed Hossein Mousavian is a Middle East security and nuclear policy expert at Princeton University and a former spokesman for Iranian nuclear negotiators.
(Source: Foreign Policy)