MADRID – After a series of exchanges, Tehran finally responded to a letter from the President of the United States.
In this connection, Abbas Araguchi announced that “the official response of the Islamic Republic of Iran was sent to the US side through Oman on Wednesday, March 26, 2025.” The Iranian Foreign Minister emphasized, “The letter includes a detailed explanation of Iran’s official position on current development and an accurate response to the points raised by President Trump.”
What surprised all the experts was that Iran chose to send the response to Donald Trump’s letter through Oman, not through the United Arab Emirates, where he was responsible for sending the US President’s message to Iran.
Previously, a delegation from the United Arab Emirates, led by Anwar Galgash, an advisor to the President of the United Arab Emirates, traveled to Tehran to deliver letters from the President of the United States to Iran. The letter was sent by Steve Witkov, a special envoy to the Middle East (West Asia) of Trump, to Mohammed bin Zayed, president of the United Arab Emirates, to Iran and handed over to the Emirates.
Oman’s choice as a channel to send responses is no coincidence. In fact, by choosing this route, Iran sends a clear message that the Muscat route could become an important part of the negotiation process. The move not only highlights Iran’s seriousness in terms of negotiations, but also highlights Iran’s diplomatic priorities through Oman, a key player in regional relations.
Oman’s choice as a mediator is the result of years of privileged bilateral contacts. Oman has historically been the closest country to Iran’s position in the Gulf, and plays an important and constructive role in mediating several issues related to Iran’s Islamic Republic.
For many years, even after the Islamic Revolution, good relations between Oman and Iran have not been affected. Unlike other Persian Gulf countries that feared the Iranian government and supported the Saddam Hussein regime, the Omani government adopted a neutral stance during the Iran-Iraq war. In fact, Oman played an important role in mediating peace agreements between the two countries, ending the conflict. Despite regional tensions, the two countries maintain close ties and openly demonstrate cooperation and mutual understanding in an environment characterized by regional uncertainty and division.
In this regard, we can understand the recent statement by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragut, as he said, “Oman has played the same role in the past.” According to an Iranian diplomat, “We have a good experience with Oman. We trust Oman’s good intentions and have a strong relationship between the two countries. The relationship between the two countries is based on mutual understanding. Therefore, Oman’s choice was a completely natural choice.”
As a sign of its character, Oman declared that it was not part of the Persian Gulf Union project and would not hinder efforts to unite other Persian Gulf countries. This stance reflects its own foreign policy, characterized by attention and pragmatism. Oman’s unwillingness stems from several factors, including sectarian differences, concerns about losing sovereignty, and the tradition of maintaining a neutral attitude towards local issues.
Furthermore, Oman refused to join the Saudi-led coalition against Yemeni resistance group Ansarra. Furthermore, Oman avoids engaging in conflicts like Yemen due to its geographic proximity and tribal ties with its neighboring countries, fearing instability and conflict will ripple over its own territory. Nevertheless, Oman continues to play a mediating role in conflict resolution efforts and has sought to maintain neutrality in the region.
Another clear example of Oman’s independent foreign policy was apparent in January 2016, when the country did not withdraw its ambassador from Iran following the incident at the Saudi embassy in Tehran. Unlike other GCC members who responded more aggressively, Oman maintained diplomatic openness, but condemned attacks on the embassy for violations of the international agreement. This attitude reflects Omani’s strategic stance. It involves balancing relationships with regional power without abandoning diplomatic independence, without hostility to neighbors or Iran.
This privileged relationship with Oman, which has been built over decades, is in contrast to the mistrust that exists between Iran and the United Arab Emirates due to its relationship with Abu Dhabi and Israel.
In 2020, the United Arab Emirates normalized relations with Israel. Along with Bahrain, they became the first Arab states to establish formal diplomatic relations with the regime since Egypt and Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979 and 1994, respectively. Abraham positioned the UAE as a close partner in Israel, as the 2020 regularization agreement is known.
Since October 7th, the image of the United Arab Emirates has experienced significant degradation throughout the region. A survey conducted by the Arab Centre Washington, DC in January 2024 revealed that 67% of respondents from 16 Arab countries thought the UAE had a bad or very bad attitude towards the Gaza War. This growing anti-wessipment poses serious challenges for nations that are highly interested in international imagery. The Emirati government is particularly concerned about reports of harassment and oral attacks directed at Emirati citizens when they travel to other parts of West Asia for relations with the United Arab Emirati and Israel.
In addition to regional backlash, there are also internal complaints about the normalization agreement with Israel. The prominent Emiratis, who once supported normalization with the Zionist regime, is now expressing disillusionment. “Israel is embarrassed by the signatories (of the agreement). Netanyahu did not freeze the settlement as promised. Israel simply doesn’t care. There’s a public response now,” explained an analyst at Emirati, a regional politics specialist. The internal disappointment and growth anxiety of the region demonstrate the tensions the UAE faces as navigating both internal challenges and the impact of collaboration with Israel.
The choice of the Omani route can therefore be understood primarily by this confidence in Muscat’s policies, which have been demonstrated over decades, and by the combination of mistrust of the United Arab Emirates and of political and military reconciliation with Israel.