TEHRAN – Marc Finau, senior advisor at the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP) and former spokesperson for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provided an expert analysis of France’s recent moves to invoke the JCPOA “snapback” mechanism and reinstate UN sanctions against Iran in an exclusive interview with Tehran Times. He also explored broader diplomatic and strategic implications for Europe and wider West Asia.
Finau highlighted the growing dissatisfaction within the E3 (France, Germany and Britain) amid the challenge of bridging the gap between Iran and the United States following Washington’s withdrawal from the 2018 nuclear deal. He reflected on the delicate balance Europe is trying to maintain between asserting its own policy agenda and avoiding pressure from Washington in the context of Iran’s growing ties with Russia and China.
Discussing the future of nuclear diplomacy, Mr. Finau stressed that durable solutions require a truly multilateral framework, with the potential to incorporate regional actors to foster trust and stability. He reflected on the JCPOA’s complex history, provided valuable insight into the lessons learned, and outlined practical steps for Iran and Europe to reduce nuclear risks and maintain a path to new negotiations.
The text of the interview is below.
France, along with Germany and the UK, recently activated the JCPOA 1 snapback mechanism, reinstating UN sanctions against Iran for so-called nuclear violations. How do you assess the strategic rationale for this snapback move, and what do you think the diplomatic consequences will be for Europe and Iran?
Apparently, there was dissatisfaction within the “E3” that initiated the JCPOA due to the failure to mediate between Iran and the United States to resolve the crisis stemming from President Trump’s withdrawal in 2018 and Iran’s response of suspending most of the JCPOA’s key provisions, which led to suspicions that Tehran’s plans were no longer completely peaceful.
Although the JCPOA is now considered expired according to the deadline of Resolution 2231, are you considering a realistic path to reviving the multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran or a new diplomatic regime for non-proliferation in the region?
The Israeli and US military strikes against Iran’s nuclear program showed that there is no military solution to this crisis, only a diplomatic solution. Apparently, President Trump prioritized bilateral agreements, while Europe, Russia and China wanted a multilateral agreement with roles for the UN Security Council and IAEA. Alternatively, a more regional agreement could be reached with Arab states and possibly Turkey, which would provide some form of mutual trust and stability and contribute to regional non-proliferation.
To what extent do you think Europe’s recent decision to trigger the snapback mechanism reflects a genuine independent policy choice rather than coordination with US pressure?
It is clear that since the United States is no longer a party to the JCPOA, it cannot initiate a “snapback” on its own. Perhaps European countries wanted to appease the US to avoid being affected by secondary sanctions or sidelined in the case of bilateral agreements. This can also be considered a kind of compensation for Israel, which criticized the Gaza war.
Given the evolving geopolitical context regarding Russia and China’s positions, how will it affect Europe’s ability to act autonomously against Iran?
Unsurprisingly, Iran now prioritizes strategic relations with Russia and China and no longer trusts Europeans. However, in the long term, once the crisis is resolved, it will be in Tehran’s interest to restore relations with the EU due to the potential for trade and investment with the world’s largest economy.
Looking back at the entire trajectory from the 2002 E3-Iran talks to today’s breakdown, what are the key lessons to be drawn for future multilateral agreements involving rivals and great powers with different priorities?
The JCPOA has been considered by many to be a successful model of diplomatic multilateral negotiations consisting of mutual concessions and benefits, with sanctions relief acting as an incentive, while the imposition of sanctions failed to achieve the political goal of changing Iranian behavior.
Given today’s diplomatic impasse, what practical measures would you recommend for both Iran and France/EU to reduce nuclear risks and keep the door open to future negotiations?
Talks should be held again, preferably in secret to avoid public and media pressure, with the aim of reaching a new agreement based on reciprocity and mutual concessions. The only way for Iran to obtain sanctions relief would be to provide verifiable assurances that its nuclear program is strictly peaceful, including full transparency about current or future peaceful uses of highly enriched uranium, especially now that Russia has offered to build new reactors using nuclear fuel supplied by Moscow.