LONDON – US policy under Trump was very different from Biden and the wider deeper state. The Obama administration has given Turkey the role of sponsoring “Sunni political Islam” to counter the axis of resistance, and Trump is stiff in opposing Turkish Middle East ambitions. Trump considers Syrian new rulers as terrorists and prefers Syrian governments supported by the Persian Gulf countries over Turkey.
Trump’s Plan A could involve dialogue between regional sponsors such as Türkiye and Qatar vs. Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The latter sees development with suspicion and caution in Egypt, but lacks important control over the situation. Once a Persian Gulf-friendly regime is in place, a peace agreement with Israel may continue. The United States monitored Turkey’s actions in Syria to protect its allies, and Syria remained divided until it became stable.
If the conflict continues, Syrian Plan B based on Trump could consist of Syria divided into four zones. It is a US-sponsored Kurdish region, Israeli controlled and lawless zones managed by Türkiye. Trump is unlikely to withdraw US troops unless they are under threat. Instead, the US would limit Turkey’s influence without direct intervention, support Kurds in the region, and exist in the Euphrates region, including Raqqa, Hasaka and Deia Ezzole, with Kurdish control. I’ll keep it.
Turkey wants to play a central role in banishing Syrian regime, which seeks to control Syria’s new leadership, and fully subservient to its interests. Unlike Iran, Turkey prefers direct intervention, aiming to annex Aleppo and Hama, if given international recognition. It also aims to disband Kurdish groups such as the US-backed Syrian Democratic Army. However, the SDF will not be disbanded or integrated into Syrian forces as the US still needs them, and Turkey will oppose their inclusion.
Israel is involved and expands its presence to Dara from the height of Golan. They seized opportunities to expand their influence and controlled water sources in elevated areas. It aims to maintain its presence and see it as compensation for unmet targets in Lebanon. The new Syrian regime will not challenge or face existence, even verbally, although local resistance may emerge.
Europe, particularly France, is closely monitoring development. France may seek partitions to limit Türkiye’s management. It has already contacted several Druze leaders and encouraged them to seek French protection. Coastal Alawian regions could emerge, perhaps under French or Turkish supervision.
Russia’s role in Syria is uncertain and its regional influence is waning. Its presence in Syria had a major impact, favoring political, economic and military influence in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Arms sales to countries in the region began as a powerful competitor of Western weapons. The Russians dreamed of reaching the Mediterranean and warm waters, so they achieved this, so it is unclear why Russia retreated. Even if the matter is related to a deal with Trump regarding Ukraine, it does not justify such a significant loss.
Iran effectively withdraws from Syria, but retains networks and individuals that have worked during their long existence. However, Iran is avoiding fighting on behalf of those who try to protect themselves. Unlike other forces, Iran prefers to engage locally to form goal-oriented groups to combat terrorism and professional organizations, rather than establishing permanent military bases. Iran’s existence was invited by the previous regime for defensive purposes, but left a few months before the regime collapsed. Iran’s previous role ended with the collapse of the regime, and its new role remains undefined.
Jurani and his group, who now rule Syria, with a history of terrorism, now face internal divisions. The Western and world order accepts Jurani because he may comply with their requirements and potentially extend his rules. However, military success does not guarantee a lasting political role, and his position may be diminished. He is someone who lacks practical depth and a reliable public image. Full compliance with Western demand could extend government lifespans, but exacerbate internal contradictions. Internal political dialogue related to local sponsors is expected, but it is unlikely to succeed. If chaos continues, instability may continue, but Syrian official and declared splits are not expected.
*The views expressed in this article are those of the author.