TEHRAN – The situation in West Asia has been changing since October 2023, when Hamas launched a surprise attack against Israel. The operation brought the Palestinian cause back to the forefront of media attention and sparked debate among elites. However, despite many Western claims, Iran’s regional influence remains a key element in West Asian power relations.
In a recent Foreign Affairs article titled “Iran’s Opportunity: What America Needs to Do to Achieve a Breakthrough,” Richard Haas argues for a combination of force and diplomacy against Iran. “It is difficult to think of any country that has lost so much influence in such a short period of time as Iran,” Haas wrote. However, his assessment of the situation on the ground contains several factual errors.
Tel Aviv has been targeting Hezbollah facilities and fighters across Lebanon for more than a year and a half, but these efforts have had little success. If Israel commits a major ceasefire violation, Hezbollah could quickly launch operations into occupied northern Palestine and even deeper into Haifa and Tel Aviv. Moreover, without Hezbollah’s participation in the political process in Beirut, the impasse in Lebanon would likely have continued, as evidenced by the election of Joseph Aoun as president.
The fall of the Assad regime in Syria was certainly a setback for the Axis of Resistance. However, the Axis powers did not rely solely on Syria. Hezbollah was an important force long before Damascus became a logistics hub for the Lebanese resistance.
Ansarullah in Yemen is also a good example of an independent resistance group. Despite being under siege by the Saudi-led coalition, Ansarullah succeeded in thwarting an attempt to overthrow the government in Sana’a. Yemenis have launched attacks against US and Israeli interests in the Red Sea and surrounding waters. It has also successfully launched missiles and drones into occupied Palestine, despite constant attacks by the US-led coalition.
More than 15 months after Israel’s attack on Gaza, Tel Aviv finally accepted ceasefire terms, which could be seen as a victory for Hamas. The three-step ceasefire agreement will take months to complete, but each agreed-upon condition appears to represent a major concession for resistance groups. Tel Aviv’s stated goal of eliminating Hamas “completely” has not been achieved. The agreement calls for Israel to completely withdraw from Gaza and exchange its prisoners for large numbers of Palestinian prisoners. In addition, Israel will gradually allow unarmed Palestinians to return to the northern Gaza Strip and will allow a significant increase in aid, with up to 600 trucks entering the Gaza Strip per day.
As this article rightly points out, Iran will likely seek to rebuild a strong resistance network against Western imperialism. The Axis of Resistance may have suffered some operational setbacks, but they are not irreparable.
In his article, Hass echoes Western claims that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. However, given the Iranian government’s continued cooperation with the IAEA and compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is clear that the Iranian government does not seek to develop a nuclear bomb. Iran’s reaction is a result of escalation against the country. The withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was the first trigger for Iranian government retaliation, and Iran gradually increased the purity of its uranium enrichment. Despite doubts about the United States’ ability to destroy Iranian facilities, an attack on those facilities would undermine the legitimacy of the negotiations. Moreover, the technological expertise that Iran has accumulated over the years will remain intact. Such an operation could push Iran to a further level of escalation and could lead to direct attacks on U.S. military facilities in regional countries.
Relations between Tehran and Moscow have strengthened in recent years, but Friday’s signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement does not elevate the relationship to one of true “strategic partners.” Contrary to what some articles have suggested, this partnership will not result in Russia or any other country providing nuclear explosive technology to Iran. The Russian government has consistently maintained a cautious stance regarding Iran’s nuclear program, and in some cases has even approved resolutions against Iran at the United Nations Security Council and elsewhere.
Furthermore, the US isolation strategy against Iran ended in failure. In return, the country has forged stronger ties with the Global South. Iran’s membership in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides an alternative to reduce the impact of unilateral sanctions.
The author argues that U.S. policymakers should increase sanctions and limit Iranian oil sales to apply further pressure. However, the Iranian government has remained resilient despite sanctions. Initially, the “maximum pressure” campaign significantly reduced Iranian oil exports. However, the Iranian government has since determined how to circumvent these restrictions by identifying new buyers who are less dependent on Washington, offering discounts, and avoiding U.S. tracking, similar to Russia’s recent experience. I found it.
It is also unlikely that the United States will be able to overthrow the Iranian government by fomenting domestic opposition and insurrection. All such attempts have failed over the past 30 years, and the United States has no beginner’s method of pitting people against each other or the government.