TEHRAN – At a recent meeting between the Israeli Prime Minister and the US president, Benjamin Netanyahu called the “Libyan model” the ideal way to engage with Iran.
This reference may appear diplomatic on the surface, but it is essentially a direct threat to the country.
The “Libyan model” refers to the 2003 agreement between the Muammar Gaddafi countries (particularly the US and the UK) to dismantle Libyan nuclear, chemical and missile programs. In exchange for a promise to lift sanctions and reintegrate Libya into the international community, Gaddafi has abandoned much of the country’s strategic capabilities. However, this process not only leads to stability, but with the onset of the so-called “Arab Spring” in 2011, NATO intervened under the pretext of supporting people and overthrowing the Gaddafi government. This memo explains why comparing Iran with Libya is not only wrong, but is fundamentally lacking strategic value.
Iran vs Libya: Structural and strategic distinctions
The Islamic Republic of Iran is based on a system of multiple resilient institutions that maintain unparalleled unity in managing external threats, under the leadership of Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei. These agencies address both internal and external challenges through coordination and synergy. In contrast, Libyan governance structures were completely personal and tribal. Muammar Gaddafi has centrally ruled the country for 40 years, and his governance was primarily based on individual will and tribal alliances. Libyan political system lacked effective and independent institutions, and instead relied on Gaddafi’s personal strength and tribal coalition. This structurally vulnerable system was fragmented into security and political disasters that were divided among various tribes and armed groups, leading to the collapse of Libya. The lack of independent, coordinated state institutions in Libya led to instability and division.
This structural and strategic distinction between Iran and Libya not only highlights the strength of the Iranian government in the face of external threats, but also the need to maintain the independence of institutional and social management during difficult political conditions. Iran is immune to the structural weaknesses that have plagued Libya, with extensive historical and discipline experience to maintain internal cohesion and threat management.
Furthermore, Iran has a rich history of standing with resistance against pressure, from imposed wars to debilitating sanctions. In all these cases, Iran pursued a “active resistance” model. This is reflected in negotiations from the sustaining nuclear programme under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the presence of effective regions in West Asia, and the position of strength with the West under the JCPOA. In contrast, Gaddafi abandoned the tools of his powers to normalize the relationship, eventually becoming a victim of the very process he engaged in.
Iran’s geopolitical status and regional influences are completely different from the influence of Libyan status. Iran is an influential actor on both regional and global scales, playing an active role in interacting with the great powers from the axis of resistance in West Asia. This strategic depth has a complex layered deterrent ability. Conversely, Libya under Gaddafi was considered a country with North Africa’s abundant energy resources and important geographical status, but had a weak regional and international presence. While Gaddafi had sought to play a role in certain regional and global developments, his internal restrictions and lack of strategic partnerships prevented him from establishing sustainable international and regional impacts. Furthermore, through Western involvement in Libya, particularly through NATO’s military intervention, it led to loss of deterrence capabilities, causing instability.
Therefore, the geopolitical location and regional influence of Iran distinguishes it significantly from Libya. Its strategic depth and indigenous power make Iran an unparalleled complex and effective deterrent ability to the Libyan situation.
Unlike Libya, which relies on externally purchased military equipment and lacks depth in strategic defense, Iran has developed its own defensive capabilities. Its defense infrastructure is based on a complex network of domestic industries, trained personnel and advanced technology.
Finally, Iran’s distrust of the West is deeply rooted in historical experiences. The collapse of Gaddafi after an agreement with the West is the best example of underscoring repeated warnings by revolutionary leaders about the reliability of the US and Western countries. Iran’s historical experience with dealing with the West, including the imposed wars, long-term sanctions, and the JCPOA all affirms the reality that the West, particularly the United States, has consistently adopted double-trade and deceptive policies to deal with Iran.
The collapse of Gaddafi after agreeing to disarm and negotiate the United States is a clear evidence of the correctness of Iran’s view of distrust towards the West. Gaddafi, who dismantled his weapons and agreed to interact with the US in 2003, was eventually unable to achieve his diplomatic goals and was killed several years later, putting pressure on NATO and Western military intervention. The event serves as a living example in Iran’s strategic memory, demonstrating that trust in the West, particularly in military and security issues, can lead to irreparable disasters.
Leaders of the Islamic Revolution have always emphasized that historical lessons from other countries such as Iran and Libya should be viewed as beneficial in strengthening the independence and deterrence of the state.
In conclusion, one of the most important distinctions between Iran and Libya is the presence of people as a true support for the system. Unlike Gaddafi’s Libya, which lacks meaningful public participation in governance, the Islamic Republic of Iran enjoys great support from those who played a pivotal role in key historic moments, including elections, assembly and resistance to external pressure. This social capital is the most important strategic support faced with models like Libya.
Here we need to refer to key concepts in security and strategic literature: “Libya syndrome” without understanding, the analysis of the Libya model is incomplete and incorrect.
Libya Syndrome: Lessons from Iran’s Strategic Memory
The term “Libya syndrome” refers to fears recreating Libya’s fate for a country withholding its ability to deter. In Iran, this syndrome works well not as mere memory, but as a strategic lesson embedded in the memory of political and security elites. It is always a reminder that concessions in the face of Western promises can be an existential cost of the country. As a result, leaders of the Islamic Revolution continue to emphasize the importance of maintaining national sovereignty and increasing deterrence.
Libyan syndrome is common not only in Iran but also in countries like North Korea, and views Gaddafi’s fate as a lesson in never trusting Western promises about disarmament.
From a strategic point of view, the Libyan experience serves as a serious warning for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, Iran must adopt a proactive, multi-layered and intelligent approach to prevent such experiences. This approach should focus not only on maintaining deterrent capabilities, but also on managing narrative warfare and strengthening internal cohesion.
The first step in this path is to solidify the story of Western betrayal. The experience of Gaddafi’s collapse must be systematically documented and spread by media outlets, think tanks, universities and public diplomatic institutions. This story should not be confined to internal spaces, but must be communicated globally and globally to cement the deceptive nature of the Libyan model in the collective memory of the nation through tools such as documentaries, television shows, artworks, and academic analysis.
Second, it is important to demonstrate Iran’s deterrent. Iran’s defense, missiles and regional capabilities should be presented in a balanced and intentional way to prevent the enemy from miscalculating. This representation of power should be one of effective deterrence, security and prevention, not one of aggression.
Third, strengthening local ties and cohesion within the axis of resistance is an irreplaceable need. The more cooperation and coordination between the Israeli regime and the actors on the resistance to US intervention, the higher the cost of threatening Iran and thus discourage the enemy from embarking on a dangerous adventure.
Fourth, there must be a positive and rebellious development of the Libyan model by intellectual elites, media experts and cognitive sphere activists. This rebuttal must expose the model as a deceptive, costly, and failed approach and remove it from the hearts of policymakers and decision makers.
Finally, strengthening internal unity and strengthening national strength is key to overcoming external threats. By increasing social participation, deepening unity among elites, trusting the younger generation, and relying on domestic capabilities, we can strengthen the internal pillars of national power.
Historical warning for the future: Iran has moved beyond the Libyan model
The Libyan model is not a repeatable example, but a historical warning to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Through wise leadership, robust structure, effective deterrence, a history of resistance, and a distinguished geopolitical position, this country is essentially incomparable to Libya. Netanyahu’s reference to this model is more than an attempt at negotiation. It is an effort to reiterate failed projects to psychologically and strategically undermine Iran and contain independent forces. However, the reality is that today Iran is not in the same position as Libya in 2003.
This analysis should help guide Iran’s approach to external and internal challenges and prevent them from falling into the trap of false foreign policy experiments. It’s time for Iran to show its solid attitude in the face of external pressure and solidify its position at the global stage.