Tehran – Simplified popular stories often prosecute history in a short, barren and politically. These oversimplifications envelop historical events and numbers, hinder clear understanding, and often twist the truth with clichés.
Iran’s modern history is full of such myths. It can be argued that these common misconceptions play a greater role in shaping modern Iranian narratives than the actual events themselves. This is especially true of the movement to nationalize Iran’s oil and the infamous coup on August 19, 1953 (Moldad’s 28th).
Ervand Abrahamian’s book, “Iran’s Oil Crisis: From Nationalism to Coup,” is based on major American documents that were declassified in 2017, and sheds new light on the Pahlavi era. It fundamentally challenges the accepted wisdom about the oil nationalization movement and the coup, providing a dramatically improved understanding of this pivotal moment in Iranian history.
Adjusted Campaign: Media and CIA for Mosaddegh
Abrahamian’s work uses new documents declassified by the US government in 2017 to correct the weaknesses in the existing history of the oil crisis. He carefully compares official reports from US and UK institutions, particularly in the American press, with the media narratives of the time being promoted.
His analysis reveals a direct link. For example, the Wall Street Journal’s series of attacks on Mosaddegh was an essentially verbatim report created by CIA director Allen Dulles and his team. The sleazy and often ridiculous image of Mossaddegu, touted by the media, was heavily shaped by instructions from American security agencies.
The document confirms that the CIA has drafted a detailed propaganda playbook for Mosaddegh. That important tactics include strengthening the Shah’s image, working together financially to lead newspapers, bribes of influential figures, and spreading rumors that would sow discord among supporters of Mossaddeg and link him to the Soviet-backed Tude party. Other planned operations included distributing false leaflets due to the Tude Party, which attacked Islam and sought the destruction of clergy, and building connections between the army commanders and tribal leaders. Previous studies by Iranian scholars pointed out that these are part of British propaganda efforts, but the new documents provide concrete evidence.
The Abrahamians also highlighted a meeting on July 29, 1952 between Ambassador Roy Henderson and George Middleton, British diplomat in Tehran. They concluded that a military coup would be required to remove the Mossaddeg, which would require the buy-in of the military commander of Tehran and must be done in the name of the Shah. The CIA station suggested persuading the Shah to publicly criticize the UK, increasing his popularity and initially pretending to support Mossad Degu. Shah himself told Henderson that without the ambassador’s actions the monarchy would have already fallen.
Myth of the threat of communism
The main section of the book is dedicated to dismantling the longstanding belief that the powerful Tude Party and the threat of communist takeover justified foreign intervention.
The standard argument was that the US and the UK were always convinced to coordinate the coup to stop Iran from falling into the realm of Soviet influence. However, Abraham’s evidence shows that this “communist threat” was primarily counterfeited by American intelligence.
The reality is that at the time the Tude Party posed no serious threat to the US, Shah, or even religious forces. What really motivated the British and Americans was the business of protecting the profits of oil companies. They also feared that Iran’s successful nationalization would set precedents and force other countries (like Egypt, like Egypt in the Suez Canal) to do the same.
The real danger they realised was the disruption of the global economic order and the possibility of Iran’s instability throughout the region. They successfully sold the public with the idea of a communist threat, but the declassified files show that US authorities knew there was no significant Soviet activity in the oil dispute and no real threat from the Tude party. The “Red Fear” was a handy tale to hide their true motivations: the maintenance of corporate profits and the international status quo.
This manufactured fear of communism became a permanent feature of Iran’s political landscape, and the Pahlavi state later truly believed in the very myths that it helped to create.
Stageded Us-uk Rift Mosaddegh has come to believe
Another important section of the book covers the political battles in Iranian parliament, showing how the US manipulated lawmakers to isolate Mosadegu. It also details Mossaddegu’s belief in a critical deception: true policy divided between the US and the UK.
The Abrahamians show that public disputes between American and British diplomats like Henry Grady and reader Bullard were essentially “fake battles.” Grady publicly criticized Britain, but he was as personal as Iran’s oil nationalization. This gradual disagreement was intended to be misleading and worked well. Many, including Mosaddegh, were actually completely united with the goal of stopping nationalisation, but were deceived to believe that the West had been divided.
The book also disproves the idea that American Democrats oppose the coup and show that their administration is fully involved. In attractive details, the document reveals that one Associated Press reporter in Tehran was in fact a CIA operative.
The false concept of the role of clergy in the fall of Mosadegu
In the final section, Abraham argues that the clergy played an important role in defeating Mossaddeg. He argues that historians like Darioush Bayandor promote this idea to use the popularity of Mosaddegh as a weapon primarily against the Islamic Republic, and retrospectively project current conflicts into the past.
Historical records do not support this view. CIA Operations When Donald Wilber tried to recruit clergy to oppose the Tude party, he met a wall of silence from the main Shiite authority, Ayatollah Borgherdi. The key clergy on the list of Ayatollah Kashani in Tabriz was actually Pro-Mosaddegh. Furthermore, notable religious figures such as Mahmoud Taleghani, Reza Zanjani and even Morteza Pasandideh (brother of Imam Khomeini) were all supporters of the Prime Minister.
The only major clergyman on his side in the coup was Ayatollah Bebahani, who was widely seen as a “clinic cleric” rather than an independent religious leader. Finally, the Abrahams argue that the coup was not caused by an economic collapse. On the contrary, he presents evidence that Iran’s economy is stable and suggests that the coup has just begun as Mossaddegu’s policies have begun to succeed and that nationalization is working. This is supported by historian Gashirowski, who cites US sources who are paying attention to the active commercial situation in Iran at the time.
Mossad degu fell to prevent trends
Based on a new flock of documents, the Iranian oil crisis makes it very clear that the Shah owed his control to the powers of America and Britain. Americans were not fascinated by Shah. They feared a global trend towards nationalization. They defeated Mossaddeg, created an example of him, and stopped the idea from spreading.
The story of the threat of communism was merely a public relations tool for frameating conflicts within the familiar conditions of the Cold War. The real goal was to protect the interests of international corporations, where many powerful Western figures had direct interests.
Despite his capable leadership, Mossaddegu was overwhelmed by a gradual conflict with his allies and lost political support in Congress. And while Shah returned to power, he ruled forever in the shadow of Mossaddeg and under the weight of his own humiliating dependence on foreign forces.