Tehran – The Non-Proliferation Treaty on Nuclear Weapons (NPT), founded in 1968, continues to serve as the basis for international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons while promoting the peaceful use of nuclear weapons.
The heart of the ongoing debate is whether Article IV of the NPT grants the right to uranium enrichment. This is a process that is not only a way to produce nuclear fuel, but also a potential route to weapons-grade materials.
On August 15, 2025, in an article in the Atomic Scientist’s Bulletin titled “In fact, NPTs do not guarantee the right to make nuclear fuel,” Henry Sokolsky and Sharon Squasoni argued that such rights do not exist, underscoring historical opposition by the Nuclear Weapons State (NWS), risks inherent in fuel-powered crime activities. They argue that the NPT text lacks explicit support for enrichment, and that protection cannot ensure that it prevents detours to military purposes.
However, this perspective overlooks the fundamental principles of the Convention on Sovereign Equality and political preferences as legal constraints, overlooking the lack of prohibitions on enrichment.
This article considers the claims made by Sokolsky and Squasoni, taking into account recent events as well as the legal texts and history of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The analysis included the Israeli-Iran conflict in June 2025, struggling with Iran’s nuclear facilities. These developments underscore concerns that nuclear governance is becoming increasingly politicized, and enforcement appears to be selective based on alliances rather than equitable application of international law. Using Iran’s nuclear programme – uniquely recognized under the Joint Comprehensive Programme of Action (JCPOA) and UN Security Council Resolution 2231 – this article argues that bias in the discussion on the nuclear issue undermines the reliability of the NPT and the increased global instability.
NPT Legal Framework
Article 1, paragraph 1 of the NPT “nothing is construed as affecting the inviolable rights of all parties to the Convention to develop the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, in accordance with Articles 1 and II of this Convention.” This provision establishes a broad estimate of nuclear-weapon states (NNW) access to nuclear technology, subject to non-proliferation protection measures controlled by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Significantly, the treaty does not list any specific technologies such as uranium enrichment or reprocessing and does not impose any restrictions on blankets. Under the principles of international law, as expressly states are, as states on Vienna Convention on Convention Law (1969), not expressly restricted by agreement. Therefore, the absence of a prohibited language in the NPT means that enrichment for peaceful purposes is permitted if it complies with IAEA verification. Sokolski and Squassoni countered “no mention of the treaty,” saying the NPT negotiations lacked consensus on the NNWS granting access to a full fuel cycle.
They cite historical documents such as the 1946 Acheson Lilienthal Report. This warned that enrichment and plutonium reprocessing were “too central to making bombs” for parents to be effective, and could lead to misleading testing.
NPT talks in the 1960s discussed proposals from countries such as the UK and Sweden to ban fuel production, but they were not adopted.
However, this historical opposition reflects political concerns rather than legal consensus. The drafters of the NPT intentionally circumvented normative technical details, particularly to balance non-proliferation and development rights in the Global South. As legal scholar Daniel Joyner argues in his interpretation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (2011), the treaty operates on a “tolerant” model. Prohibition is explicit and not inferred. Recent IAEA assessments reinforce this interpretation. In its May 2025 report, the IAEA highlighted that no detours to military purposes were detected prior to the June conflict, but pointed to an enrichment of Iran’s 60% purity (not banned under the NPT itself) for 60% purity.
NPT’s protection system, although incomplete, provides a framework for verifying peaceful intent to counter the claim that enrichment is inherently unverified.
Political aspects: Asymmetry and double standards in nuclear governance
The enrichment argument is closely related to the imbalance of power in the global nuclear order. The analysis of Sokolski and Squassoni exemplifies Western-centric narratives where NNWS programs, particularly in non-alliances, are inherently suspected. They emphasize Iran’s claims as a proliferation risk to rich rights, and the nearest reprocessing rights of the 1970s, when they disregard similar reniens for the alliance, while undermining similar reniens.
This selective scrutiny assumes there is no single evidence that programs like Iran are “military oriented” and reflects the broader discourse that burdens NNWs with validation while avoiding comparable obligations. The Israeli-Iran conflict in June 2025 clearly demonstrates these double standards. On June 13, Israel launched a preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, scientists and military commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, citing suspicions of its proximity to Iran’s nuclear weapons. The US continued its air strike targeting Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan from June 21-22, with the aim of reducing Iran’s capabilities. Iran retaliated with a missile strike, but a ceasefire was announced on June 23. Israel, a non-NPT state with at least 90 nuclear warheads, has launched military action against NPT signatories, despite not facing IAEA surveillance.
This disparity tolerating Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons translates nuclear governance into a tool in geopolitics, prioritizing alliances over legal equality. Such actions perpetuate a system in which the NWS and its allies act as self-appointed “verifiers” and impose costs on others due to their own strategic insecurities. The non-alignment movement has long criticised it as a neocolonial, claiming it undermines NPT’s “magnificent bargains” in exchange for access to technology.
Iran’s nuclear program: legitimacy amid escalation
Iran’s programme exemplifies the tension between legal rights and political pressures. Under JCPOA and UNSCR 2231, Iran’s enrichment activities were explicitly recognized and levels and stockpiling restrictions were defined in time frames to ensure peaceful use. Before 2025, the IAEA report consistently found that since 2003, the US Intelligence Report estimates that there was no evidence of diversion.
The 2025 Israeli attacks, condemned by China and Russia, and numerous other states, underscore the potential of a violation of international law that military intervention could bypass the diplomatic framework and promote proliferation rather than preventing it.
The consequences of unfair nuclear norms
Selective enforcement undermines the legitimacy of NPTs and promotes instability. The 2025 conflict disrupted US-Iran talks, expanded regional tensions, and involved the risk of wider war.
By allowing non-NPT states like Israel to attack compliant programs, the international community shows that legal compliance does not provide protection and encourages NNWS to reconsider NPT membership or pursue a hedging strategy. This undermines global norms, as seen in the stagnant NPT Review Conference and the increasing calls for reform from the Global South. Furthermore, the strike has puts risks humanitarian and environmental catastrophes, among other things. In the long run, such actions will destabilise the Middle East, and Israeli weapons will be enormously fired up arms races by scrutiny.
Policy Recommendations
To mitigate these risks and restore equity:
1. Non-NPT officials with no accountability: The UN Security Council should investigate the 2025 strike as a violation of the IAEA principles that prohibit attacks on nuclear facilities.
2. Revive and strengthen the JCPOA: Resuming US Iran’s speeches by converting it to P5+1 format, while Iran and E3 can return to their duties under the JCPOA.
3. Promoting universal disarmament: The NWS should accelerate Article VI commitments, including Arsenal reductions, and rebuild trust. It will engage non-NPT states like Israel in confidence building measures.
4. Promoting multilateral validation: Expand IAEA resources to provide fair monitoring and reduce reliance on unilateral actions.
5. It refrains from politicizing the IAEA and allows institutions to become professional and fair.
Dr. Sasan Karimi is the assistant international perspective at the Paiab Institute, director of international political programs at the Nuclear Watch Network, and assistant professor at the University of Tehran.