MADRID – Iranian parliament chair Mohammad Bakar Karibah acknowledged extensive interviews with National Television and discussed in detail the 12-day war between Iran and Israel.
In this dialogue with documentary film director Javad Moghui, Karibahu provided a clear technical and political perspective, simultaneously highlighting the resilience and adaptation capabilities of Iranian military forces, while simultaneously highlighting the weaknesses exposed during the conflict.
Among the most notable aspects of his argument was the neutralization of previous jamming attempts targeting Iranian missile programs. This directly refers to similar operations as the Lebanese device explosion. Renewal of command within the ranks of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in front of leaders of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seiyed Ali Khamenei. President Masudo Pezeschkian’s explicit support for the military. Demand for clear conditions for a potential ceasefire. Technical and tactical modernization of Iran’s missile capabilities.
Karibahu revealed that for years the enemy would infiltrate a chain of military orders into chips and electronic systems, affecting several missile platforms. Nevertheless, he explained that the vulnerability was detected and fixed about seven years ago. He explained that this highlights both the technical complexity of the conflict and Tehran’s ability to deal with secret manipulation. This scenario highlights the hostile strategic actions faced by Iran. This extends beyond open conflict to include sophisticated sabotage targeting critical military infrastructure.
One episode of Karibah, addressed with a certain candidity, was Iran’s delay in response after Ismail Hanie’s assassination in Tehran, refusing to accusations of “defence of the government or fear of commanders.” His technical explanation focuses on the limited consequences of missile attacks identified as “Operation True Promise 1,” with the satellite system in which the enemy monitored and detoured several Iranian missiles in real time, achieving lower effectiveness than expected. Lessons drawn from that episode are treated as urgent warnings to strengthen and modernize attack systems, demonstrating the ability to self-criticize and learn, which is rarely recognized in Western analysis of conflict.
Regarding military operations in 12 days of hostilities, Karibahu highlighted the increased accuracy and refinement of the attack. He explained that from day one to day seven, the strategies involved would start both day and night, with fewer missiles but greater effect. He recalled the strategic impact on Israeli cities of Beershever, where one Iranian missile was fired and successfully targeted. He further elaborated at the missile launch after the start of the ceasefire declared by Iranian officials, claiming that as Israel is the first invader, Iran’s highest national security council determined that the final response would come from Tehran.
From a military perspective, this story plays an important role. It projects a proportional and controlled response policy aimed at not only demonstrating defensive power, but minimizing tactical errors and maintaining high internal morale, projecting a proportional and controlled response policy aimed at internationally sending messages of calculated strength.
Hamas and Hezbollah
In the interview, Karibahu was asked directly about Hamas’ operations on October 7th, and it may be considered a tactical mistake given Hamas’s vast weakening. His response began by emphasizing the importance of the context. Hamas said he acted not as a nihilist group but as a force to free the land from occupation.
The interviewer pushed whether the decision to attack itself was a mistake. Karibah responded that it was an action taken independently by Hamas without prior participation or knowledge from Iran or Hezbollah. He also rejected the notion that Israel allowed the attack to create pretexts, underscoring the operation to disrupt the image of Israel’s absolute intellectual control, and stressed that even if Tel Aviv was given a choice, it would not be exposed to two years of public conflict without a clear victory.
Karibahu emphasized that both Hamas and Hezbollah operate in sovereignty and make their own military decisions based on what they interpret as the interests of their people. He asserted that Iran continues to provide political and logistical support as long as there is a shared strategic vision, but has not hampered this tactical autonomy. This explanation places Iranian policy within the framework of mutual respect and regional coordination, avoids imposition and reinforces the alliance’s narrative based on affinity rather than subordinate.
Another topic discussed was the role of Hezbollah. Asked to compare it to the war of 2006, the losses that were damaged in the recent conflict denied the defeat of the Lebanese organization. He shared his personal experiences of visiting at three important moments. When Israel reached Beirut in 1982. When Hezbollah consolidated its position since 2006. And in October 2024, when he traveled to Lebanon during the attack. In all cases he successfully insisted resistance by hindering Israel’s plans.
He explained that all wars have the highest and lowest values, and that tactical set-offs are not equivalent to strategic defeats. “No one would say that Israel lost the war on October 8th due to a moment of weakness,” he pointed out. He further emphasized that the US’s claim to demand Hezbollah’s disarmament demonstrates its enduring importance in the regional equation. As an additional example, he cited Gaza. Under the total blockade, still sophisticated weapons can be developed and active conflicts can be maintained.
When asked for a specific example, Kalibahu showed that Israel had launched a ground attack with five divisions up to the Ritani River, following the attack on the communications system and the martialism of Said Hassan Nasrara. Hezbollah resisted the ground and forced the Israeli forces to abandon their advance, he said. From his point of view, the current state of the Lebanese organization is even stronger than previous conflicts.
Asked why he traveled to Beirut during the war, Karibah explained that his presence was intended to boost the morale of the army after the loss of Nasrara, comparing his fighting experiences and circumstances during the Iran-Iraq war. He confirmed that he personally piloted the plane during its landing under the threat of drones and bombing as part of a deliberate effort to convey confidence to ground fighters.